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THE ALCHEMY OF EFFECTIVE AUDITOR REGULATION
by
Sarah J. Williams*
The audit profession has repeatedly failed in its obligation to accurately opine
on financial statements prepared by companies that trade in U.S. markets.
The list of entities that have contributed to the quest for effective regulation of
these auditors is long; it includes the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
Congress, outside directors of public companies, and the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a recent congressional creation. Yet,
despite 50 years of effort, the formula for efficacious oversight of the audit
profession remains elusive.
In 2020, then-president Donald Trump proposed to subsume the PCAOB
into the SEC, citing regulatory duplication and budget savings. This proposal
could have been summarily dismissed as fodder for a deregulatory political
agenda, but reactions to the proposal from those outside the discrete enclave of
securities regulators revealed deeper concerns about the state of auditor
regulation that beg our attention.
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Sarah J. Williams is an Assistant Professor of Law at Penn State Dickinson Law with over
25 years of experience as a securities regulator. She served for 15 years as Deputy Director at the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. She served as Counsel to Commissioner Isaac C.
Hunt Jr., Enforcement Division Branch Chief, and Enforcement Division Staff Attorney while at
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and performed the roles of Assistant and Associate
General Counsel at NASD (now FINRA). The author thanks her colleagues at Dickinson Law
for their support in writing this Article, as well as her research assistant, Najeebah L. Beyah, for
her diligence in performing legal research and gathering data vital to the author’s scholarly agenda.
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This Article is the first in a series of planned articles exploring regulation theory
as a path to answering the clamant question: What is the alchemy of effective
auditor oversight? This Article begins the discussion by examining the methods
by which regulators have determined which auditors would be subject to
regulatory oversight, and the extent to which that process furthers the purported
goals of more reliable audit reports. This Article establishes that regulatory
processes to define the audience of regulated entities have been disinterested at
best, and self-interested at worst. This Article articulates the need for a
complete departure from the stale, recycled approaches that have been
implemented under the guise of improved regulation. A fresh approach with a
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clear nexus to the objective of promoting fair and accurate audits of public
company financial statements is imperative to advancing in the discovery of
an efficacious formula for auditor oversight.
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Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 484–85 (2010).
See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 981 (2005) [hereinafter Nagy, Playing
Peekaboo]; Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB a “Heavily Controlled Component” of the SEC?: An
Essential Question in the Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 361 (2010) [hereinafter
Nagy, PCAOB] (providing a constitutional analysis of the PCAOB after issuance of a decision in
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); Michael A. Thomason, Jr.,
Note, Auditing the PCAOB: A Test to the Accountability of the Uniquely Structured Regulator of
Accountants, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1953 (2009) (analyzing the applicability of the Appointments
Clause to the PCAOB).
2
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The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) is
a private, governmentally created, nonprofit entity empowered with extensive power
to oversee accounting firms involved in auditing public companies pursuant to
federal securities law. Since its inception, the PCAOB’s unique creational model
has attracted scholarly attention. Beyond that, the agency has been largely
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consigned to the category of obscurity in academia. On February 10, 2020, the
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) released then-President Trump’s
Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 2021, which included a volume
entitled The Major Savings and Reforms, Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 2021. The proposed budget recommended the consolidation of the 18year-old PCAOB into the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
starting in 2022. The justifications for the consolidation were presented as
reductions in agency ambiguity and duplication. The proposal further noted that
moving the Board’s responsibilities to the SEC would ensure oversight over the fees
assessed on market participants.
To the extent Trump’s proposal to transfer the responsibilities of the PCAOB
to its overseer reflects concerns about the conduct of the audit profession, it is far
from groundbreaking. The proposal is yet another foray in the decades old struggle
to unearth the formula that will turn auditors into effectively regulated entities. The
history of regulation of public company auditors reveals a sporadic and reactive
rejumbling of corporate, governmental, professional, and non-governmental
resources, in a trial-and-error fashion, that has most recently produced the PCAOB.
A plethora of possibilities exist for the allocation of responsibilities among the
various parties interested in promoting quality audits of public company financial
statements. The entities that may be involved in such oversight range from the
accounting associations charged with training and supporting public company
auditors, to the public companies in need of audit services, to the government
regulators responsible for mandating the use of auditors—in this case, the SEC. The
newest entrant in the evolving apportionment of audit oversight responsibility is the
PCAOB, a congressionally created, yet non-governmental agency, which currently
carries the bulk of the auditor oversight responsibility.
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3
See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1072 (2018) (statement of Lisa Heinzerling, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center) (referring to the PCAOB as “rather obscure”).
4
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE: MAJOR SAVINGS AND
REFORMS, FISCAL YEAR 2021 (2020).
5
Id. at 179.
6
Id.; see also Mark Maurer & Paul Kiernan, White House Proposal for SEC to Absorb Audit
Watchdog Raises Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2020, 3:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/white-house-proposal-for-sec-to-absorb-audit-watchdog-raises-concerns-11581624345
(noting likely savings from combining the two entities as a result of removing duplicative costs in
such areas as information technology and administration).
7
Daniel Austin Green, Accounting’s Nadir: Failures of Form or Substance?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 601, 633–34 (2010) (“Every bit of PCAOB’s mission and power was already part of the existing,
if broken and failing, structure of accounting oversight. Sarbanes-Oxley, in creating PCAOB, in
no way remedied any flaws.”).
8
Andrew J. Morris, The Sarbanes Oxley Privilege for Public Company Accounting Oversight
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Trump’s proposal should have stirred a mainstream debate over the costs and
efficacy of the PCAOB as a regulatory body, given the interests of many American
households in reliable audits of the financial condition of their investments, as well
as the use of money from the companies in which Americans invest to fund the
operations of the agency. Yet, the PCAOB and the statute creating it are largely
disregarded by the public, crippling accountability and improvement. Reactions
to the budget proposal by those involved in financial regulation were swift and
varied. A supporter of Trump’s proposal opined that the PCAOB was an ineffective
regulator. Opponents protested that moving the PCAOB’s responsibilities to the

01/04/2022 08:12:00
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Board Materials: Its Implications for SEC Enforcement Proceedings, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE
87, 87 (2015) (“Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—the
‘PCAOB’—and charged it to oversee the auditors of public companies.”).
Esteemed scholars have explored the regulatory classification of the PCAOB, given its
confusing status as a congressionally created yet non-governmental entity that is privately funded
but overseen by the SEC. See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a
Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 60 n.279 (2013) (noting the incongruity of delegating
regulatory powers to private entities like the PCAOB without mandating the corresponding
transparency and accountability of governmental agencies); Nagy, PCAOB, supra note 2, at 385
(noting that the PCAOB is unlike a self-regulatory organization in that it was created by the
government and its leadership is appointed by the government); CATHERINE E. RUDDER, A. LEE
FRITSCHLER & YON JUNG CHOI, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING BY PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS:
CHALLENGES TO A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 11, 68–69 (2016) (characterizing the PCAOB as
a private, hybrid agency created by, yet operating with some degree of independence from, the
government). Moreover, the academy has considered the wisdom of cloning this approach to
create new regulatory agencies in other areas of securities regulation. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel,
The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisers Act After Seventy-Five Years, 10
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405, 426–27 (2016) (discussing the Consumer Federation of
America’s support for an agency modeled after the PCAOB to oversee investment advisers). This
Article does not endeavor to replicate or improve upon these bodies of scholarship.
9
See Paul D. Paton, Rethinking the Role of the Auditor: Resolving the Audit/Tax Services
Debate, 32 QUEEN’S L.J. 135, 158 (2006) (explaining that the PCAOB is funded by investors in
public companies in an effort to enhance the agency’s independence); see also Christopher C.
DeMuth Sr. & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the Age of Executive Government, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 555, 565 (2017) (“The PCAOB’s annual budget of about $250 million is funded
almost entirely by its own tax, which it calls an ‘accounting support fee,’ on the equity capital or
net asset value of public companies and broker-dealers.”).
10
Cheryl L. Wade, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Ethical Corporate Climates: What the Media
Reports; What the General Public Knows, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 421, 422 (2008)
(“Only a fragment of the population participates in today’s discourse about [the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act]. . . . The general public no longer has easy access to (or interest in) news about the Act’s
shortcomings, or the changes in the way the Act is interpreted or implemented . . . If the public
is no longer paying attention, the business community no longer needs to concern itself with its
public image.”).
11
Jim Peterson, So What if the SEC Swallowed the PCAOB?, GOING CONCERN (Apr. 1,
2020), https://www.goingconcern.com/what-if-sec-swallowed-pcaob/?doing_wp_cron=1613243
935.4288289546966552734375 (“Never in its history has the PCAOB punched even its own
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SEC would exceed the government regulator’s bandwidth, and the agency’s
termination would signal that “high quality audits are no longer a priority.”
Defenders of the PCAOB supported its continuing existence, but some nonetheless
noted concern about its approach and function. Skeptics of the PCAOB’s success
in fulfilling its mission of improved audit quality expressed agnosticism at the
prospect of the agency’s consolidation. It is also important to note that the
PCAOB was the object of criticism before Trump proposed its consolidation.
Scholars previously warned that that SEC’s delegation of authority to the PCAOB
created additional oversight costs, shrouded regulatory activities from public
purview, and created regulatory tension with the SEC. In response to criticisms of

01/04/2022 08:12:00
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light weight. . . . The PCAOB had no visible effect during the 2007-2008 crisis, when cascades of
companies with clean audit opinions fell into failure, take-over, or government bail-out. Nor does
it inspire confidence that outbreaks of predictably doubtful behavior continue apace—recent
examples include Mattel, UnderArmour . . . .”).
12
See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Without an Independent Watchdog, Who Will Audit the Auditors?,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2020, at A17 (“The [Securities and Exchange] commission’s mandate is
already full, and to meet the expectations set for the PCAOB would require an expansion of staff
and expertise not currently funded by the Trump administration’s budget proposal.”); Jovalin
Dedaj, Trump Plan to Nix Audit Watchdog Would Hurt Markets, LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2020,
4:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1245589/trump-plan-to-nix-audit-watchdogwould-hurt-markets (“The SEC may not have the expertise to take the PCAOB’s place and, even
though the SEC’s total outlays are set to increase through 2025 by $78 million, it is unclear how
much of that increased funding would be dedicated to audit inspection and enforcement.”).
13
James R. Doty, How Congress Got It Right on Audit Oversight, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb.
24, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/02/24/how-congress-got-it-right-on-auditoversight/.
14
Levitt, supra note 12, at A17 (concluding that while the PCAOB is a good idea overall,
the agency should be more aggressive in its enforcement efforts, and the SEC’s supervision of the
agency is inadequate); Jason Bramwell, Could We Soon Be Living in a PCAOB-less World?, GOING
CONCERN (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.goingconcern.com/could-we-soon-be-living-in-a-pcaobless-world/ (describing the views of one accounting professor that the PCAOB should leave
standard setting to the accounting profession, and a different accounting professor’s opinion that
the SEC should assume the PCAOB’s inspection function only).
15
Peterson, supra note 11 (“For the moment, however, ill-motivated as may be the
enthusiasm of this White House to kill off the PCAOB, the 18-year failure to justify its existence
makes its proposed disappearance of too little consequence to matter.”).
16
Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1112 (2007) (“Nevertheless, the PCAOB considers itself to be a
supervisory—rather than enforcement-body, and to this extent its effectiveness is inherently
limited.”); Donna M. Nagy, Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 11, 31 (2006) (“As a private entity, even one that is subject to SEC oversight, the PCAOB
is less publicly accountable, its operations are less transparent, and its policymaking is less
legitimate than its federal regulatory counterparts. Moreover, the PCAOB’s status as a private
corporation raises, rather than lowers, the overall costs of its regulatory program.”); Green, supra
note 7, at 631 (“Since PCAOB’s creation, it has been engaged in an extensive turf war with the
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the agency lobbed by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, William Duhnke, then
chairman of the PCAOB, apparently affirmed perceptions about the agency’s lack
of transparency.
This Article is the first in a series that critically examines individual pillars of
audit regulation to discern optimal operation from the perspective of improved
audit quality and cost effectiveness. With that foundational analysis complete, the
culminating article will propose the optimal regulatory approach for effective audits
of public companies.
To the extent the PCAOB is a refurbished version of previously discarded and
ineffective regulatory approaches, Trump’s proposal for its demise has some allure.
It, and the insular dialogue it stimulated, begs a larger question: What balance of
participation among the various entities impacting audit quality will achieve optimal
regulation? Put another way, what is the alchemy of effective auditor oversight? This
Article is the first in a series that explores that question through the lens of regulation
theory. It examines the history of auditor oversight to discern the elements necessary
to optimize regulatory effectiveness of audits of public companies. The series
accomplishes this goal using the core PCAOB functions as a baseline for assessing
effective regulation.
This foundational contribution to the series is devoted to the structural core of
auditor oversight—identifying regulatory recipients. Regulatory theory would
categorize this activity as a form of verifiability. The manner in which audit firms
are targeted for regulatory oversight has morphed over the years and currently exists
under the PCAOB’s approach as audit firm registration. The dearth of scholarship
on the PCAOB registration process has been lamented. Further, the need for close

01/04/2022 08:12:00
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SEC, and the SEC appears to be winning.”).
17
Michael Cohn, PCAOB Plans Further Changes on Inspections and Quality Control, ACCT.
TODAY (Dec. 3, 2019, 6:13 PM), https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/pcaob-plans-furtherchanges-on-inspections-and-quality-control (quoting Duhnke, in responding to former SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt’s criticisms of the agency, as saying, “The only people who know what’s
going on at the PCAOB are the people working at the PCAOB, so let me tell you, I disagree with
the vast majority of what former Chairman Levitt wrote.”).
18
The PCAOB is also responsible for overseeing the audits of broker-dealers, a responsibility
it received in 2010 via the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, in
response to the Bernie Madoff scandal. This primordial Article does not address the PCAOB’s
responsibilities with respect to audits of broker-dealers.
19
Verifiability encompasses a broad category of activities undertaken to facilitate monitoring
of regulated groups for purposes of assessing compliance. David L. Markell & Robert L.
Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014).
20
John L. Abernathy, Michael Barnes & Chad Stefaniak, A Summary of 10 Years of PCAOB
Research: What Have We Learned?, 32 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 30, 33 (2013) (“Despite the
significance of the registration process, there is a paucity of academic literature regarding
registration with the PCAOB.”).
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examination of the functions performed by non-governmental regulators is dire.
This Article helps to fill that void. The Article expresses the view that improvements
to the process by which regulators obtain oversight of audit firms are needed to
transform it from a vestige of self-regulation to a tool of audit quality improvement.
Part I of this Article reviews the history of audit regulation and the
consequences for investors when audits are performed poorly. Part II describes prior
attempts to improve the quality of public company audits. Part III presents the
traditional rubric for effective regulation, identifies the oversight functions of audit
firm membership and registration as regulatory verifiability, and explores the
implications of these functions as previously implemented. Part IV outlines
initiatives to reset existing approaches to verifiability, which are mired in irrelevant
remnants of self-regulation, to align with improved audit quality. This Article asserts
that changes to the auditor registration process are necessary to achieve
improvements in the quality of the audits upon which U.S. investors rely, and stem
the tide of rising costs of auditor regulation.
I. THE CREATION OF AUDITORS AS GATEKEEPERS

C M
Y K
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21
RUDDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 152 (“[P]rivate governance needs to be seen. Making it
visible is the work of scholars, specialists in think tanks, and the serious press.”).
22
STACEY L. BOWERS, ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE FINANCE FOR LAWYERS 1–2 (2019).
23
Id. at 2.
24
See generally MATTHEW J. BARRETT & DAVID R. HERWITZ, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS
155 (5th ed. 2015).
25
1 JOHN L. CAREY, RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION, FROM TECHNICIAN TO
PROFESSIONAL, 1896–1936, at 5 (1969) (describing the advent of independent auditors in the
mid-19th century).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 17 (describing the role of auditors under English law in 1845 as affirming or

43829-lcb_25-4 Sheet No. 32 Side A

The practice of accountancy began in the ancient civilizations of Egypt and
Mesopotamia. The invention of the abacus and transition from Roman numerals
to Arabic numbers in the eleventh century improved the usability of accounting,
and the documentation of double-entry bookkeeping in the fourteenth century
strengthened its accuracy. While accountants are typically referred to as bean
counters, they are actually responsible for ensuring that the bean count is recorded
in a manner consistent with applicable accounting principles.
The practice of auditing financial records evolved centuries after the practice
of accountancy developed. The auditor’s role was to protect shareholders of the
enterprise from the poor recordkeeping practices and wrongful financial acts of the
entity’s management. While accountants were responsible for preparing the books
and records of an entity, it was the auditor’s job to confirm, by reviewing the entries
and examining supporting evidence, the accuracy of those records. Audit
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reporting on the financial accounts presented by corporate management).
28
Id. at 21–22.
29
HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING: AN INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 156 (Michael Chatfield
& Richard Vangermeersch eds., 1996).
30
Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants and Congress Created
the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 750–51 (2004) (explaining that while
provisions for auditors began to appear in English Law in the 1840’s, auditor protections in
United States appeared much later).
31
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 33 (2001) (“[T]he Sherman Act triggered a
wave of horizontal mergers among competitors that, in the process, also diluted existing
blockholders and thereby created dispersed ownership.”).
32
HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING, supra note 29, at 601.
33
AM. INST. OF ACCOUNTANTS, EXAMINATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS BY
INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 1 (1936) (explaining that complexities in business

43829-lcb_25-4 Sheet No. 32 Side B

standards, training requirements, and professional associations emerged around this
newly forged position. English accountancy practices then migrated to the United
States. British accountants appeared in the United States, reviewing American
companies’ financial statements for their English clients, and establishing
accounting firms in the country. This influx fueled the growth of American
accountancy firms, and encouraged the formation of professional accounting
organizations, including the American Association of Public Accountants (now the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants or “AICPA”) in 1887.
While the practice of accountancy grew in the United States, English law
requiring independent audits did not take root in America as quickly. American
bankers encouraged independent audits, but no law made it mandatory.
Accounting became more complex after anti-trust legislation encouraged the merger
of industry competitors. A premier example of the challenges of such mergers is the
1901 consolidation of eight competing steel companies to form the largest
corporation then in existence, United States Steel Corporation (“U.S. Steel”). The
creation of U.S. Steel brought a widely diverse group of investors together in one
enterprise, and raised challenging questions about how to present the financial
information of the new entity. The company’s shareholders elected Price
Waterhouse & Co. as its auditor, which insisted that the financial statements reflect
a consolidation of the financial information of each of the operating subsidiaries of
U.S. Steel, not the financial position of the parent company alone. This evolution
in the disclosure of financial information elevated the importance of both
accounting and auditing in the United States.
The complexities of corporate structures inspired the American accounting
industry to value accurate disclosures regarding financial conditions to shareholders,
and independent audits of such financial information to ensure the reliability of
those disclosures. Some companies took the initiative to obtain financial statement
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audits. For example, a large insurance company located in New York hired the firms
of Price Waterhouse & Co. and Haskins & Sells to conduct audits of their financial
statements in 1905, after facing investigation by the New York state legislature based
on allegations of excessive spending and speculative investments. While the
number of companies receiving voluntary audits of their financial information rose,
the practice of using outside auditors as a shareholder protection mechanism
remained optional in the United States for a number of years. The New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) was instrumental in generating change in this area.
The NYSE fashioned itself as an elite market, trading only the highest quality
of stocks at high volumes and high prices. Consistent with this approach, and on
the heels of the stock market crash of 1929, the NYSE established a rule in 1932
that required all newly listed companies to receive independent audit reports on
their financial condition. This mandate (along with certain other investor
protection rules) became federal law with the enactment of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Thus, audits of financial statements became mandatory in the United
States for publicly traded companies as a tool of investor protection, and continues
to serve that function today.
II. DISCARDED FORMULAS FOR AUDITOR OVERSIGHT
A. The Audit Profession as Rule Makers
Independent audits, while valuable, proved fallible in identifying unreliable
financial statements of public companies. The first significant example of this
fallibility after the adoption of mandatory audit reports for public companies trading
in the United States involved an accounting fraud at McKesson & Robbins, Inc.
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organizations and industrial progress made it more challenging for businessmen to value their
assets).
34
CAREY, supra note 25, at 29–30 (describing the launch of an investigation by the State of
New York after public allegations of internal difficulties at large insurance companies); see also
Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 723, 730 (2000) (describing the allegations that led to New York’s
investigation of insurance companies).
35
Coffee, supra note 31, at 36.
36
Sean M. O’Connor, Strengthening Auditor Independence: Reestablishing Audits as Control
and Premium Signaling Mechanisms, 81 WASH. L. REV. 525, 538 (2006).
37
Id. at 529.
38
Douglas C. Michael, Self-Regulation for Safety and Security: Final Minutes or Finest Hour?,
36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1075, 1098 (2006) (noting that while the Enron crisis, which led to the
creation of the PCAOB, was new, detection of issues in the accounting performed by U.S. public
companies was a familiar occurrence).
39
Sheila D. Foster & Bruce A. Strauch, Auditing Cases That Made a Difference: McKesson &
Robbins, 5 J. BUS. CASE STUD., July/August 2009, at 1, 1 (declaring McKesson & Robbins one of
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the earliest cases vital to the development of audit standards).
40
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2707, 1940 SEC LEXIS 1528, at
*5 (Dec. 5, 1940).
41
Id.
42
CHARLES KEATS, MAGNIFICENT MASQUERADE 71–72 (Richard P. Brief ed., 1982).
43
Id.
44
Jaysinha S. Shinde, John Willems, Menghistu M. Sallehu & Matthew P. Merkle,
Establishment of GAAS: Impact of an Auditing Fraud, 15 J. ACCT. & FIN. 40, 42 (2015).
45
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 1940 SEC LEXIS, at *19–20.
46
Id. at *23 (wherein the SEC indicated that auditing procedures should include the
inspection of inventory, and auditing steps previously viewed as optional should be accepted as
normal auditing procedures for public company financial statements).
47
Phillip Barber, Bull in the China Market: The Gap Between Investor Expectations and
Auditor Liability for Chinese Financial Statement Frauds, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 379
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An SEC report of findings on the company revealed that after 13 years of operation
under the leadership of its President Frank Coster, the company’s financial
statements reflected fictitious sales transactions with non-existent entities that
generated almost $2 million in paper profits and approximately $21 million in
imaginary assets. The report also revealed the Frank Coster was an alias adopted
by Philip Musica, a convicted fraudster.
Price, Waterhouse & Co. (“Price Waterhouse”) had served as the outside
auditor for McKesson, but its audits of the company’s financial statements failed to
detect the phony transactions on the company’s books. Musica was able to carry out
this accounting fraud under the noses of the Price Waterhouse accountants by
focusing the phony transactions in an area he knew the auditors did not physically
check—inventory. Inventory, at that time, was reviewed using paper records, not
by physical confirmation. Musica’s fraud was ultimately uncovered by company
insiders who had been stonewalled in their plan to convert the company’s profits
into cash.
The SEC investigation into this matter concluded that Price Waterhouse had
committed no wrongdoing, as its reliance on records to confirm inventory was
consistent with generally accepted auditing practices in effect at that time, but noted
a substantial body of “equally authoritative opinion” supporting the view that
auditors should make physical contact with inventory as part of their processes.
The need for formal standards to govern the audit process was glaring; the question
presented was to whom the responsibility for creating those standards should fall.
The SEC answered this question in 1941, when it introduced the notion of generally
accepted audit standards into the auditor’s opinion, thereby bestowing upon the
accounting profession the obligation to create formal audit standards. The
accounting profession answered that call by establishing a Committee on Auditing
Procedures to develop a set of audit standards, including steps requiring physical
contact with inventory during an audit. This development represented the formal
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introduction of the accounting profession to the role of audit regulator.
B. The Outside Directors as Auditor Overseers
Revelations of accounting frauds at public companies and corresponding
allegations of shortcomings in the performance of those auditing the financial
statements continued to arise, despite the presence of the audit profession in the
regulatory role of standard setter. These challenges came to a head in June 1970,
when the Penn Central Transportation Company (“Penn Central”) unexpectedly
declared bankruptcy, setting the bar as the largest bankruptcy to date in the nation’s
history. Penn Central had merged with another large railroad company, New York
Central, in 1968, creating an entity that was expected to be a high quality, blue chip
investment for investors. In reality, the company was hemorrhaging money soon
after its formation as the result of poor planning, the declining use of railroads in
the United States, the additional personnel expense mandated by the terms of the
merger, and the overzealous efforts by Penn Central management to diversify with
activities that were outside of the transportation industry. To disguise these losses,
Penn Central executives pursued a policy of maximizing reported income wherein
they encouraged creative accounting practices that transformed transactions with no
substance into transactions that generated profits and hid expenses, resulting in
financial statements that masked the company’s precarious financial position.
Penn Central’s auditor, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (“Peat”), was aware of
the income maximization policy at Penn Central and was often consulted about
these accounting practices. Peat acquiesced to Penn Central’s management with
respect to these aggressive accounting decisions and stayed mute in its audit reports,
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(2013) (describing the American Institute of Accountants’ response to the need for audit
standards: first by issuing bulletins to communicate audit standards, then releasing a set of
standards establishing generally accepted audit standards in 1948).
48
See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, Accounting Series Release No. 248, 1978 SEC LEXIS 1451 (May
31, 1978) (finding that the auditors of Western Equities, Inc. failed to perform their duties as
outside auditors by certifying the company’s 1964 and 1965 financial statements when the
financial statements improperly included the earnings of acquired companies, and profits from a
transaction that was not at arm’s length); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(involving shareholder allegations that the outside auditor of Yale Express failed to disclose
misleading information contained in the company’s annual reports and various interim reports).
49
STAFF OF SEC, 92D CONG., THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL
COMPANY, at iii, 1 (Subcomm. Print 1972).
50
Id. at 1–2; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 19502005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1515 (2007).
51
STAFF OF SEC, supra note 49, at 3–4.
52
Id. at 4.
53
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11517, 1975 SEC LEXIS 2516
(July 2, 1975).
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despite its knowledge of the overstatements contained therein.
Peat was disciplined by the SEC for its audit failures in this matter, as well as
four others. In response to these missteps, the SEC, joined by the AICPA and the
NYSE, made recommendations for the establishment of audit committees to serve
as an independent line of communication between corporate management and
boards of directors. More importantly, audit committees were tasked to appoint,
and communicate directly with, outside auditors. In essence, corporate management
was leveraged to strengthen the ability of outside auditors to withstand the pressure
of corporate insiders interested in communicating financial success in the company’s
financial statements.
C. Deputizing the Audit Profession
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Id.
Sanford Kreiger, Recent Developments in Audit Committees, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1999, at 24.
56
Id.
57
RONALD L. SOBLE & ROBERT E. DALLOS, THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: THE EQUITY
FUNDING STORY: THE FRAUD OF THE CENTURY 38, 158 (1975).
58
Id. at 19, 158.
59
See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1978).
60
Barber, supra note 47, at 381.
61
Id. at 381–82.
62
STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON REPS., ACCT., & MGMT., 94TH CONG., THE ACCOUNTING
ESTABLISHMENT: A STAFF STUDY 7 (Comm. Print 1976) (“Serious questions have been raised
55
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Revelations of a massive financial fraud at Equity Funding Corporation of
America (“Equity Funding”) in 1973 again put public company auditors in the cross
hairs of regulation. Equity Funding, incorporated in 1960, was a NYSE-listed
company primarily engaged in marketing and selling insurance products. Between
1968 and 1971, the company engaged in a massive fraud to hide its operating losses
by creating fictitious insurance policies that generated fake insurance premium
payments that the company claimed as income on its books. The company’s
outside auditor, a small firm of Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff, & Lapin, was aware of
inconsistencies and unsupported information in the company’s financial statements,
but nonetheless issued unqualified audit reports on the company’s financials. The
three accountants involved in the poorly performed audits were criminally convicted
of fraud and sentenced to prison terms.
Once again, the accounting profession was under the microscope; this time, it
denied wrongdoing. Instead, the AICPA adopted standards permitting the
disclaimer of auditor responsibility for verifying certain items in a company’s
financial statements. Congress, however, did react. A Congressional staff report
was issued in December 1976 describing its perspective on the accounting
industry. This report, which became known as the Metcalf Report, found the audit

43829-lcb_25-4 Sheet No. 35 Side A

01/04/2022 08:12:00

LCB_25_4_Article_3_Williams (Do Not Delete)

2022]

EFFECTIVE AUDITOR REGULATION

12/27/2021 12:59 PM

1101

industry in dire need of auditors of public companies that could be independent of
corporate client interests and embrace their obligations to the public. The report
further derided inclinations of the SEC to relegate responsibility for quality
accounting to the industry itself:
To an astounding degree, the SEC has permitted, and even insisted upon,
establishment of accounting standards which have substantial impact on the
Federal Government and the public by self-interested private accounting
organizations. The result has been an extraordinary delegation of public
authority and responsibility to narrow private interests.

The Metcalf report described the lack of public information on the largest
accounting firms that were performing audits for most public companies in the
United States, and noted the importance of auditing standards in establishing the
responsibilities of public company auditors. The report urged greater public
discourse on audit standards being adopted by the AICPA, the entity with standardsetting authority at that time. It also urged the establishment of a self-regulatory
agency to oversee auditors.
The audit profession rallied mightily to avoid government oversight and it
ultimately succeeded. In 1977, the AICPA formed the Division for CPA Firms,
which consisted of two sections—one for firms providing services to public
companies, those under the oversight of the SEC (the “SEC Practice Section” or
“SECPS”), and one for private companies (the “Private Companies Practice
Section”). The Division was formed in direct response to auditing failures in the
industry and the threat of government regulation, which the accounting industry
feared as a regime of policing and punishment. The industry believed an
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concerning the independence and competence of the ‘Big Eight’ accounting firms and other
independent auditors. Those questions have arisen because of accounting and auditing problems
involved in the Penn Central collapse, the Equity Funding fraud, improper and illegal activities
by Gulf Oil Corp. and Northrop Corp., and the many other abuses by corporations which have
come to public attention in recent years. A common complaint in such cases has been, ‘Where
was the independent auditor?’”).
63
Id. at 17.
64
Id. at 20–21.
65
Andrew W. Reiss, Note, Powered by More Than GAAS: Section 10A of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act Takes the Accounting Profession for a New Ride, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261,
1281 n.109 (1997).
66
U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF., GAO/AIMD-96-98, THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: MAJOR
ISSUES: PROGRESS AND CONCERNS 12 (1996) (“In 1977, the AICPA instituted a voluntary peer
review program that included reviewing public accounting firms’ systems of quality control for
their accounting and auditing practices, creating the SEC Practice Section within the AICPA to
administer the program, and creating the Public Oversight Board to oversee the SEC Practice
Section and to represent the public interest.”).
67
PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., SEC PRAC. SECTION, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., AUDIT
QUALITY: THE PROFESSION’S PROGRAM 5–7 (1985) (describing the establishment of the Division
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environment of professional guidance and support would be more effective in
improving the quality of audits and fostering reliable and accurate financial
statements.
AICPA member firms could choose to join the SEC Practice Section, the
Private Companies Practice Section, both sections, or neither section. The primary
objectives of the SEC Practice Section were (1) to use self-regulatory mechanisms
such as oversight and education to effectuate high standards of performance in the
audits of public companies under the oversight of the SEC; and (2) to inspire public
confidence in the ability of the accounting profession to self-correct without the
need for greater governmental intrusion into the practice.
The Division for CPA Firms was the structure used to identify the firms that
would be subject to the self-regulatory model, and the corpus for execution on the
mission of self-policing. The Public Oversight Board (“POB”) was constituted in
1978 to represent the interests of the public by serving as an independent overseer
of the SEC Practice Section’s work. A core function of the SEC Practice Session
was to establish a program whereby members would review, assess, and deliver
feedback on the SEC-related work performed by their audit firm peers (referred to
as “peer reviews”).
It is notable that the Division regulated the accounting profession at the firm
level, instead of at the individual CPA level. This was a meaningful shift from the
traditional paradigm of regulating professional practices by influencing the behavior
of individual accountants. This approach made the firm responsible for
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for CPAs as a response to public and Congressional criticism; and characterizing government
regulation as punitive, while casting self-regulation as focused on education and communication).
68
Robert L. Bunting, Transparency: The New Peer Review Watchword, CPA J., Oct. 2004,
at 6, 8 (noting that the voluntary nature of membership in the sections of the Division for CPA
Firms weakened arguments that the peer review processes adopted by each were effective policing
mechanisms).
69
PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., SEC PRAC. SECTION, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS.,
ANNUAL REPORT 1982–1983, at 17 (1983) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1982–1983] (discussing
the importance of the publicizing the SEC Practice Section’s programs to strengthen the
credibility of the profession and motivate more firms to voluntarily submit to its oversight).
70
Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 115 (2005).
71
Timothy J. Fogarty, The Imagery and Reality of Peer Review in the U.S.: Insights from
Institutional Theory, 21 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 243, 243 (1996) (“[T]he primary means used by
the accountancy profession to restore social confidence in their core work has been peer review
programs. The inspection of audit work performed by one practitioner by another practitioner
has been the main technology whereby professional self-regulation occurs.”).
72
PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., SEC PRAC. SECTION, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS.,
ANNUAL REPORT 1983–1984, at 7 (1984) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1983–1984] (describing
the innovative structure of the Division for CPA Firms in focusing on accounting firms instead
of individual accountants).
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O’Connor, supra note 36, at 562 & n.234.
Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through Improvement
of Oversight of the Auditing Process, Securities Act Release No. 8109, Exchange Act Release No.
46120, Investment Company Act Release No. 25624, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,964, 44,976–77 (June 26,
2002) [hereinafter Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information].
75
Mark, supra note 16, at 1110–12.
76
ANNUAL REPORT 1982–1983, supra note 69, at 24 (describing the functions of the POB).
77
Dale R. Rietberg, Auditor Changes and Opinion Shopping—A Proposed Solution, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 211, 214 (1988).
78
Mindy Jaffe Smolevitz, Note, The Opinion Shopping Phenomenon: Corporate America’s
Search for the Perfect Auditor, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 1077, 1110 n.154 (1987).
79
Id.
74
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establishing and monitoring the practices of its accounting professionals. The
creation of the POB was also a notable event as it introduced a new resource into
the mix of participants involved in the endeavor to develop effective audit
regulation—independent monitors from outside the industry to police the
profession’s efforts to police itself. The POB was to be comprised of persons of
prominence and high integrity working outside of the accounting industry in
positions such as former public officials, lawyers, bankers, academics, and business
professionals. The POB also included staff and administrative support for the POB
members. The POB’s independence from accounting industry influence was to be
maintained through its non-accounting leadership, and funding sourced from the
dues paid by the individual SECPS members, instead of AICPA funds. The POB
was to monitor the peer review and special investigations committees of the AICPA’s
executive committee, and serve as a liaison to the SEC on efforts to improve the
audit profession. The audit profession and the SEC would have to let the passage
of time establish the success of the regulatory combination of self-regulation with
an overlay of supervision by a panel of non-accountant professionals that would
deliver the desired effect of improved audits.
Less than a decade after the SEC Practice Section came into existence, a new
public scandal reprised the question of the credibility of the audit profession. This
time, the scandal centered around allegations of “opinion shopping,” the act of
changing auditors to secure an opinion that management’s proposed accounting
treatment of a particular transaction or event is consistent with generally accepted
accounting principles even though the treatment obfuscates the true economic
substance of the transaction or event. The scandal started with Penn Square, a
financial institution that had received a qualified report on from its outside auditor,
Arthur Young Co., for its fiscal year ended 1980 financial statements. Penn Square
fired the audit firm and hired Peat Marwick, which issued a clean bill of health in
the form of an unqualified opinion on the bank’s financial statements for the
subsequent year. The bank became insolvent three months later. The collapse of
Penn Square had a domino effect on other banks with which it had done business;
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Eric G. Behrens, Note, Classification of Loan Participations Following the Insolvency of a
Lead Bank, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1116–18 (1984).
81
Accounting for Gains and Losses Incurred in Connection with Certain Securities
Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 20266, 1983 SEC LEXIS 599 (Oct. 6, 1983).
82
Id.
83
Wade, Exchange Act Release No. 21095, 1984 SEC LEXIS 1275, at 1093–94 (June 24,
1984).
84
Id. at 1090.
85
Id. at 1092.
86
Daniel L. Goelzer, The SEC and Opinion Shopping: A Case Study in the Changing
Regulation of the Accounting Profession, 52 BROOK. LAW REV. 1057, 1065 (1987).
87
Rietberg, supra note 77, at 215.
88
Gary Klott, Auditors Face U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1985, at D1.
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that effect was of such significance that it generated substantial losses at major
banking institutions, like Chase Manhattan Bank of New York and Continental
Illinois.
The SEC did not address auditor misconduct with respect to Penn Square, but
in 1983, the Commission settled an administrative proceeding brought against two
savings and loan companies that had been facing significant financial losses as a
result of failed attempts to hedge against a sudden drop in interest rates in 1982.
Both institutions were advised by their respective outside auditors that they could
not defer these losses to future periods. The companies terminated their respective
outside auditors and hired the accounting firm of A.M Pullen & Co. (“Pullen”),
which raised no objections to the deferral of losses that the prior auditors had
rejected. The SEC ordered the two banks to restate their financials to correct the
erroneous accounting treatment, and sanctioned three partners at Pullen in
connection with the matter. The SEC noted that these individuals concluded that
the accounting treatment rejected by prior auditors was acceptable, despite
indications to the contrary in their own analysis, internal guidance at the firm,
relevant accounting guidance existing at the time of the work, and the conclusions
reached by the banks’ prior auditors. The Commission was emphatic in its order
that the practice of opinion shopping adversely impacted the integrity of the audit
profession. The Commission also solicited comments on possible rulemaking to
address the unsavory practice.
Risks to the reliability of audited financial statements posed by the practice of
opinion shopping were reflected in rulemaking comments solicited by the SEC on
this topic as well as hearings convened in the House of Representatives to discuss
the SEC’s activities regarding the practice. The AICPA’s progress in gaining
effective oversight of auditors was again in the public eye. At the conclusion of this
particular hullabaloo, the participants involved in audit regulation remained
unchanged; however, both the AICPA and the SEC modified their respective rules
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to create additional protections against the insidious practice of opinion shopping.
The SECPS continued to implore Congress to refrain from using its legislative
powers to address the perceived failings of the industry to police itself.
By 2002, the regulatory hypothesis that self-regulation with independent
oversight by non-accountants would be effective to police public company auditors
had been disproven. The rising stock market of the 1990s and the propensity for
large companies to achieve successful growth through acquisitions created an
environment ripe for disappointment in public company auditors. That
disappointment came in like a wrecking ball when the public learned that Enron’s
financial statements were being questioned by the SEC and that Enron’s outside
auditors had begun shredding its records on Enron audits after hearing news of the
inquiry. Additional wrecking balls followed for the accounting industry, as
accounting frauds at major corporations like WorldCom, Inc. and Tyco unfurled,
demonstrating that public company auditors had left their posts as gatekeepers to
join their corporate clients in profit maximization and investor misdirection.
Investors suffered mightily during this era of discovery of the true financial
condition of companies that were instrumental to their financial growth.
Despite years of assurances from the AICPA and the SEC that the components
of self-regulation and independent non-governmental oversight could achieve
effective regulation of public company auditors, the financial scandals from 2000 to
2002 proved otherwise. The start of the 21st century was marred by restatements of
financial condition by public companies and loss of investment gains in the stock
market, leading to a reactive finger-pointing exercise in which the audit profession
was yet again targeted for its failure to deliver reliable reports on the financial
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Rietberg, supra note 77, at 228. The SEC Practice Section of the AICPA adopted
additional membership requirements mandating that firms establish standards for rendering
advice to non-audit clients seeking their expertise, and the SEC amended its disclosure rules
around public company reporting of changes in accountants. Id.
90
PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., SEC PRAC. SECTION, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS.,
ANNUAL REPORT 1985–1986, at 35 (1986) (“Thus, we strongly urge that . . . Congress refrain
from adopting any legislation further regulating the profession until it evaluates the nature and
effectiveness of the profession’s responses to the challenges it now confronts.”).
91
Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127 (2002).
92
Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After SarbanesOxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 357 (2003).
93
Marianne M. Jennings, Restoring Ethical Gumption in the Corporation: A Federalist Paper
on Corporate Governance – Restoration of Active Virtue in the Corporate Structure to Curb the
“YeeHaw Culture” in Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 387 (2003) (detailing the nature of the
accounting frauds executed at WorldCom and Tyco).
94
Aronson, supra note 91, at 127 (“From March, 2000 through September 30, 2002, the
U.S. stock markets lost half of their market capitalizations, reducing investors’ net worth by almost
$8.5 trillion.”).
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condition of the public companies it had audited.
D. Creating a New Regulator
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See generally M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again” Using Bounty Hunters to
Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?
A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004).
96
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 84–89 (Comm. Print 2002) (noting the
various public and private sector entities involved in monitoring the activities of Enron, and
congressional efforts to examine the performance of each in carrying out their duties with respect
to Enron).
97
Nagy, PCAOB, supra note 2, at 366–67.
98
Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information, supra note 74.
99
Id. at 44,967–68.
100
Id. at 44,968.
101
David Ruder, Yuji Sun & Areck Sycz, The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Pre- and
Post-Enron Responses to Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1103, 1111 (2005).
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After the Enron debacle, Congress set out to perform its own assessment of the
composition of influencers involved in the regulation of auditors responsible for
reviewing the financial statements at public companies. That assessment resulted
in a series of reforms wrapped into one piece of legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley,” “S-Ox,” or the “Act”). The Act significantly altered the
formula for audit oversight by creating the PCAOB, a private, nonprofit
corporation. At the time of Congress’s action, the SEC had already developed a
blueprint for a new regulatory approach to replace the self-regulatory regime
comprised of the SECPS and the POB. The approach proposed by the SEC in 2002
would permit the SEC to designate private, not-for-profit entities as “public
accountability boards,” or “PABs,” that would be responsible for overseeing
accounting firms engaged in auditing public companies. The SEC’s proposal was
transparent in its intent to address those operational characteristics of self-regulation
that it perceived as having contributed to the financial failures at the turn of the
millennium. The SEC hypothesized that the self-regulatory approach to
overseeing auditors had failed for reasons that included unreliable funding of the
oversight function, the performance of inconsistent peer reviews by public
accounting firms, the voluntary nature of SECPS oversight, ineffective sanctions,
and nonpublic proceedings.
Congress chose to take the reins on this issue via legislation, rather than
allowing an executive agency to address the matter through rulemaking. Its solution,
however, reflected much of the substance of the SEC’s detailed plan relating to
revised oversight. Scholars have considered the question of whether federal
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legislation was the right vehicle to accomplish audit oversight reform, which
proved to be a prophetic consideration given the subsequent challenges to the
constitutionality of the legislatively-created PCAOB. S-Ox deviated from the
SEC’s suggested approach as it related to the oversight of auditors of public
companies by creating one private, not-for-profit agency that would report to the
SEC.
Since its formation, the PCAOB has been the subject of criticism from
constituents both inside and outside of the agency. Moreover, despite the
legislative reforms implemented in 2002, allegations of financial irresponsibility and
audit failures at public companies continue to generate public dialogue about the
effectiveness of the agency. Finally, the Trump administration raised the question
of whether the agency’s overlapping authority with the SEC represents an
opportunity to generate regulatory efficiency by combining the agencies.
By enacting S-Ox, Congress has largely delivered the regulatory functions of
102
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal
Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225 (2005) (describing the need
for analysis of determinations as to the appropriate body to undertake federal corporate
governance reforms).
103
See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
104
Ruder et al., supra note 101, at 1111 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation codified the
substance of the Commission’s PAB proposal by establishing the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB). . . .”).
105
Lynn E. Turner, Reforming the Auditing Profession, CPA J., Feb. 2020, https://www.

cpajournal.com/2020/03/04/reforming-the-auditing-profession/ (discussing ongoing shortcomings in
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the audit profession regarding lack of independence, transparency, independent governance, and
quality); Colleen Honigsberg, The Case for Individual Audit Partner Accountability, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 1871, 1871 (2019) (asserting that “[d]espite repeated regulatory interventions, accounting
failures continue to persist in companies around the world.”); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Bd. Member,
PCAOB, Statement Regarding the PCAOB’s Revised Research and Standard-Setting Agendas:
Reducing Credibility, Accountability and Confidence in the Financial Reporting Process (Oct.
13, 2020) (criticizing the agency’s research and standard-setting agenda as inadequately reflecting
the views of investors and posing a danger to the credibility of the agency itself).
106
See, e.g., Michael Whitmire, Audits Are Broken. Here’s a Radical Way to Fix Them,
CFO.COM (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.cfo.com/auditing/2019/11/audits-are-broken-heres-aradical-way-to-fix-them/ (attributing the failure of the PCAOB to prevent more recent accounting
failures, such as those investigations regarding UnderArmour and Mattel, to the fact that the
agency examines audits performed by auditors only after the audit has occurred).
107
See Maurer & Kiernan, supra note 6 (reporting Rep. Bill Huizenga’s view that a
conversation about consolidating the PCAOB into the SEC is necessary); Jason Bramwell, Could
We Soon Be Living in a PCAOB-less World?, GOING CONCERN (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.
goingconcern.com/could-we-soon-be-living-in-a-pcaob-less-world/ (citing a scholar’s concern
about the duplication in standard-setting responsibilities between the PCAOB and standard
setters outside of the realm of public company audits); Peterson, supra note 11 (discussing the
agency’s lack of credibility and events suggesting that the PCAOB has not contributed to
improved audit quality).
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the SEC Practice Section and the POB to the PCAOB, with modifications driven
by 20/20 hindsight of such financial debacles as Enron and WorldCom, in yet
another attempt to manufacture an antidote for auditor abdication of gatekeeping
duties. In sum, the PCAOB is a reactionary, rather than a progressive, model that
has failed to meaningfully evolve after almost two centuries in existence. A
progressive perspective at a granular level is necessary to get to the kernel of effective
audit oversight.
III. AFFIXING THE LENS OF REGULATORY THEORY
A. The Rubric of Regulation
Regulatory entities, whether governmental or industry-driven, typically rely on
three mechanisms to achieve their respective missions—standard setting,
monitoring, and enforcement. Standard setting articulates the objectives that the
regulated entities are expected to achieve; it establishes and provides an overall
direction for the industry’s composition. Monitoring reflects the information
gathering activity of the regulator—it seeks to understand how the regulated entities
are performing. Compliance assessments and enforcement activities are tools
designed to modify the behavior of regulated entities.
The PCAOB is obligated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to set standards for public
company audits, a role previously carried out by the AICPA’s Auditing Standards
Board, under the oversight of the Public Oversight Board. The PCAOB is
mandated under the Act to inspect audits of public companies performed by
accounting firms, which audits serve as the PCAOB’s primary monitoring
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108
See, e.g., Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Many Features of Transnational Private Rule-Making:
Unexplored Relationships Between Custom, Jura Mercatorum and Global Private Regulation, 36 U.
PA. J. INT’L 875, 908–09 (2015) (describing the typical functions of the regulatory process as
“standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement”); Sharon Yadin, E-Regulation, 38 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 101, 130 (2020) (noting that individualized regulatory contracts can reflect
standard-setting, monitoring, or enforcement); Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory
Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 666–67 (2012) (describing standard setting, monitoring, and
enforcement as government functions that are allocated to regulatory entities in self-regulation).
109
See MARTIN LODGE & KAI WEGRICH, MANAGING REGULATION: REGULATORY
ANALYSIS, POLITICS AND POLICY 13–14 (2012) (describing the functions of standard setting,
monitoring, and enforcement).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Faith Stevelman, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility: Challenges for the
Academy, Future Lawyers, and Corporate Law, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817, 848 n.132
(2008/2009).
113
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 943 (2003).
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mechanism; the SECPS arranged for audit firms to examine each other under a
peer review process. Finally, both the PCAOB and its predecessor were authorized
to enforce compliance by regulated firms, although criticism has been levied
against both the PCAOB and its predecessor SECPS regarding lax enforcement
efforts.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provided the core elements of regulation in its design
of the PCAOB. Yet, the PCAOB is under a barrage of criticism, as described
above, for failing to exert its full regulatory prowess. How does regulatory theory
explain why this oversight agency, created with all the requisite components of
effective regulation, nonetheless produces such significant and credible reactions of
dissatisfaction and disappointment?
One easy explanation is that the agency’s design is adequate, but its
performance (or lack thereof) has triggered a negative response from its vested
constituents. In the lingo of regulatory theorists, the PCAOB may have lost
“democratic legitimacy,” generally defined as involving three core concepts:
transparency in processes and decision-making, inclusiveness in considering the
perspectives of those impacted by its decisions, and accountability for its decisions
and results achieved. Scholars have explicitly and implicitly levied criticism
against the PCAOB for its lack of transparency, noting that the agency is not
burdened with the strictures of the Administrative Procedures Act, the Freedom of
Information Act, and the Government in Sunshine Act. While democratic
legitimacy could be an element of the PCAOB’s challenges, a more detailed analysis,
tailored to the operative activities of auditor oversight, is necessary to uncover the
roadblocks to the agency’s efficacy.
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A.C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and Irrational Liability, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
19, 33 (2006).
115
Id. at 30.
116
Id. at 35.
117
See Michael Cohn, PCAOB Hits Pause on Setting Up New Outside Advisory Groups, ACCT.
TODAY (June 22, 2021, 3:56 PM), https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/pcaob-hits-pauseon-setting-up-new-outside-advisory-groups (describing complaints about the drop in
enforcement actions at the PCAOB); Mark, supra note 16, at 1110 (noting the failure of the
oversight body of the SECPS—the POB—to sanction any major accounting firm during its
existence).
118
Pritchard, supra note 114, at 33 (“There can be little question that the PCAOB’s scope
of regulatory authority is adequate to the task set for it by Congress.”).
119
RUDDER ET AL., supra note 8 at 46; see also Anna Spain, The U.N. Security Council’s Duty
to Decide, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 320, 336 (2013) (describing a proposal for reform of the U.N.
Security Council that focused on enhancing the agency’s “accountability, transparency and
inclusiveness . . . with a view to strengthening its legitimacy and effectiveness”).
120
See Kimberly N. Brown, Presidential Control of the Elite “Non-Agency”, 88 N.C. L. REV.
71, 127 (2009); see also Nagy, PCAOB, supra note 2, at 363.
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B. The Role of Verifiability in the Auditor Oversight Regime
My path to discerning the successful components of effective auditor oversight
starts where the authority to regulate an accounting firm typically begins—I focus
on the mechanism deployed to determine those accounting firms that will be
subjected to auditor oversight. The SECPS and its successor, the PCAOB, were
formed in response to concerns about a discrete subsection of the accounting
profession—firms involved in auditing the financial statements of public
companies. Identifying those firms that should be subject to oversight is an element
of the regulatory theory of verifiability, defined as “the capacity to monitor
compliance with regulatory requirements.” Scholars have recognized the role of
verifiability of compliance in various industries, including artificial intelligence,
environmental protection, and family law. Verifiability, therefore, is an
important part of the dialogue on formulating sound auditor regulation.
Obtaining verifiability for all auditors of public companies has been a historical
challenge to oversight of the audit industry. Verifiability, in the form of
identification of accounting firms to be subjected to oversight, was implemented
maladroitly by the SEC Practice Section, as its approach was simultaneously
overinclusive and underinclusive. Verifiability was overinclusive because it
encompassed all accounting firms, regardless of whether they actually audited public
companies. The SECPS’s rules required firms seeking membership to submit
membership applications, but any CPA firm that agreed to comply with its
membership requirements was permitted to join. This open-door policy was
adopted to increase the number of member firms in the practice section, purportedly
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Markell & Glicksman, supra note 19, at 18.
Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging Robots: Innovative
Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 437 (2017)
(describing a proposed approach to regulation of AI reflecting the need for policies that
incorporated “verifiability of compliance”).
123
See David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented”
State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 10
n.31 (2000) (describing scholarship in the area of environmental protection that considers the
identification of regulated parties and monitoring compliance as elements of the enforcement
aspect of regulation).
124
See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the
Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 359 (2015) (proposing a
licensing or registration approach for purposes of delivering benefits to non-traditional families
that would otherwise pose verifiability issues for regulators because of the difficulty in
independently identifying such families).
125
SEC PRAC. SECTION, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., SEC PRACTICE SECTION
REFERENCE MANUAL § 1000.04 (14th ed. 2000) (“All CPA firms are eligible for membership in
the Section even though they do not practice before the SEC.”).
126
Id.
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providing evidence to the government and the public that the audit profession was
supportive of (and willingly engaged in) self-regulatory efforts. As a result of its
open-admission policy, the SECPS maintained a steady population of member firms
that did not audit SEC companies. Between 1980 and 1988, an average of 54% of
the SECPS’s member firms had no SEC clients. The SECPS nonetheless made
lemons into lemonade by reviewing portions of the firms’ audits of private
companies.
Rejection of self-regulation by certain firms engaged in auditing public
companies further hampered compliance verifiability by the SECPS and was an
ongoing source of frustration for the organization. During the period between its
inception and 1988, the SECPS lowered the membership requirements, reduced
membership dues, alleviated requisite insurance coverage minimums, removed the
obligation to report the names of SEC clients, and launched a membership
campaign, all to entice firms engaged in auditing public companies into the sphere
of regulation. The SEC resorted to the bully pulpit to try to encourage more firms
to join the SECPS. The SECPS and the Private Companies Practice Section
jointly hired a public relations firm to increase membership and educate the public
on the importance of membership to service quality. Faced with the risk that the
SEC would move forward with its own proposal to provide oversight of public
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See PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., SEC PRAC. SECTION, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS.,
ANNUAL REPORT 1981–1982, at iv (1982), wherein the Chairman of the POB described the
Board’s view that SECPS membership evidenced the industry’s dedication to self-regulation.
128
See Public Oversight Board Annual Reports for years ended 1980 to 1988, indicating
that the number of SEC Practice Section firms with and without SEC clients for each of those
periods, available at https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_arprts/.
129
See, e.g., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., ANNUAL REPORT 1979–1980, at 2 (1980)
(explaining the “report reviews” that would be performed on firms that had no SEC engagements).
130
See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 1983–1984, supra note 72, at 22 (“The Board shares the view
of the SEC as reported in its most recent report to Congress: ‘The Commission continues to
believe that all accounting firms which audit public companies should join the SECPS.’”).
131
See ANNUAL REPORT 1979–1980, supra note 129, at 23–24 (describing changes to the
SEC Practice Section’s membership requirements to attract additional firms to join); see also
ANNUAL REPORT 1982–1983, supra note 69, at 28 (referencing several campaigns initiated to
increase membership).
132
Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the AICPA Seventh
National Conference on Current SEC Developments: The 1980s: The Future of the Accounting
Profession (Jan. 3, 1980), wherein the Chairman noted, “The first unresolved issue relates to
membership in the Section. On the positive side, it appears its 230 member firms audit almost
9,000 public companies . . . Unfortunately, however, approximately 600 accounting firms that
have at least one SEC audit client have not yet joined the SEC Practice Section.”
133
See PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., SEC PRAC. SECTION, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS.,
ANNUAL REPORT 1984–1985, at 22 (1985).
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company auditors, the SECPS made membership in the section mandatory for
all AICPA members engaged in the audit of SEC clients. This led to a dramatic
rise in SECPS membership, from 519 firms in 1989 to 1,257 firms by August
1995. This membership requirement boosted the SECPS’s oversight to cover
97% of audits being performed on public companies. Despite this increase, total
verifiability remained elusive; certain accounting firms preferred to relinquish their
AICPA membership, rather than their audits of public companies, to SECPS
oversight.
In creating the PCAOB, Congress eschewed the SECPS’s approach of
membership as a form of verifiability, instead adopting “registration” as the vehicle
by which the Board would define its audience of regulated firms. Congress
replicated the self-regulatory approach of the SECPS by regulating the audit firm
entities, instead of individual auditors. Moreover, the S-Ox legislation made
PCAOB registration mandatory for a public accounting firm that prepares, issues,
or participates in the preparation or issuance of any audit report with respect to any
issuer, declaring, “It is unlawful for a firm that has not registered to continue to
audit public companies. Conditioning eligibility to audit public companies on
registration with the Board is the linchpin of the Board’s authority.”
Unlike the SECPS, the PCAOB was backed by the strength of federal law to
enforce verifiability as an element of its regulatory approach. Specifically, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires PCAOB registration of all firms engaged in auditing,
or participating in the audits of, registered firms. Like the SECPS, however, the
PCAOB experienced difficulties in achieving verifiability. In 2007, the SEC brought
actions against 69 accounting firms for engaging in the audits of public companies
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AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., ANNUAL REPORT 1988–1989, at 2–3 (1989)
(“[T]he SEC may well implement its proposed program—adding new and inappropriate
requirements for public company auditors.”).
135
Paul R. Brown, Jeanne A. Calderon & Baruch Lev, Administrative and Judicial Approaches
to Auditor Independence, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 443, 449 (2000) (stating that all members of
the AICPA auditing public companies were required by AICPA membership rules to be a member
of the SECPS, effective 1990).
136
U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF., supra note 66, at 84.
137
Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information, supra note 74, at 44,992
(“We estimate, however, that approximately 80 accounting firms that are not currently members
of the SECPS would likely become members of a [public accountability board] under the
proposed rules. These firms are, we believe, smaller firms with one or two SEC clients that chose
not to join the SECPS. Under the proposed rules, however, these firms would likely join a [public
accountability board] in order to maintain those SEC clients.”).
138
Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A New Ballgame
for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 78–79 (2003).
139
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URB. AFFS., PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING REFORM
AND INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 2002, S. REP. NO. 107–205, at 7 (2002).
140
Nagy, Playing Peekaboo, supra note 2, at 1009.
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while not registered, in violation of federal law and PCAOB rules. A 2021 SEC
administrative proceeding demonstrates that the SEC continues to police
verifiability in furtherance of the PCAOB’s oversight objective. Moreover, the
PCAOB has denied the registration applications of over 20 accounting firms found
to have performed audit-related activities while unregistered, in violation of S-Ox
and Board rules, suggesting that verifiability presents an ongoing challenge to
auditor oversight.
C. Using Verifiability to Establish Expectations for Auditors
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SEC Charges 69 Audit Firms and Partners for Issuing Audit Reports While Not Registered
with the PCAOB, SEC NEWS DIGEST (Sept. 13, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/
2007/dig091307.html.
142
See Knauth, Exchange Act Release No. 4207, 2021 WL 1297855 (Apr. 5, 2021) (alleging
that neither the individual auditor nor its accounting firm were registered with the PCAOB at the
time the audit firm issued an audit report on a public company).
143
See, e.g., Registration Application of BDO Italia S.p.A., PCAOB Release No. 102-2017002 (June 6, 2017); Registration Application of BDO AG, PCAOB Release No. 102-2012-003
(May 22, 2012); Registration Application of Davis, Graber, Plotzker & Ward, LLP, PCAOB
Release No. 102-2010-001 (Jan. 19, 2010).
144
ANNUAL REPORT 1979–1980, supra note 129, at 36.
145
Id. at 36–40.
146
Id. at 39.
147
For the fiscal year ended 1982, the SECPS terminated the SECPS membership of 24
firms on this basis, despite simultaneous concerns about the need to increase membership. See
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The SECPS used the process of verifiability to establish standards of conduct
for the firms under its oversight. The SECPS membership application required the
applicant firm to agree to comply with all of the conditions of membership.
Conditions of membership included having a majority of partners who were
qualified to engage in public accounting, adhering to AICPA quality control
standards, submitting to peer reviews, ensuring that all professionals obtained
specified hours of continuing professional education, and filing an annual report
with the SECPS that would be made available for public inspection. Further,
members were required to maintain a certain level of liability insurance and pay
assessed dues. The SECPS verifiability approach was sufficiently tailored to
obligate member firms to comply with SECPS oversight and to further the goals of
the organization in improving audit quality.
Reports issued by the SEC Practice Section demonstrate that it considered
membership substantively significant. Membership was voluntary, and open to
firms both engaged in practice before the SEC and firms not so engaged, yet the
SECPS took steps to terminate membership of firms that did not abide by the
membership criteria, including the obligations to submit annual reports, pay dues,
and provide information to the SECPS in advance of a peer review. Failure to
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comply with such conditions of membership resulted in the removal of 30 firms
between March 1980 and June 1983 from membership for failure to comply with
administrative obligations to pay dues and file reports.
The SEC Practice Section established verifiability by both requiring the firm
to agree to comply with its rules, and by requiring the applicant firm to provide
specified information about itself as part of the membership application process.
The SECPS application process provided an additional mechanism for verifiability,
as the information gathered was useful in determining the appropriate scope of
monitoring firm compliance. For example, the SECPS process required applicant
firms to identify their public company clients, and provide a description of the firm’s
internal organizational structure. Unfortunately, the SECPS subsequently
eliminated these (and other) verifiability components from the membership
application process in connection with its efforts to coax more public company
auditors into regulatory oversight.
In contrast to the SEC Practice Section, Congress imposed only one
commitment upon firms seeking to register with the PCAOB for purposes of
auditing public companies. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act required that each applicant
firm agree to cooperate with any requests from the Board for documents or
testimony, and to secure similar consents from individuals associated with the
applicant firm. However, the requirement did not apply to accounting firms
based outside of the United States. While S-Ox provided that foreign accounting
firms would be subject to the statute to the same extent as a domestic accounting
firm, S-Ox gave the PCAOB broad authority to exempt foreign accounting firms
from any provisions of the legislation. The PCAOB used its exemptive authority
under the Act to permit audit firms located outside of United States to withhold
their agreement to provide documents and testimony to the Board during the
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PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., SEC PRAC. SECTION, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., ANNUAL
REPORT 1981–1982, at 19, 33 (1982) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1981–1982].
148
See PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., SEC PRAC. SECTION, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS.,
ANNUAL REPORT 1980–1981, at 16 (1980); ANNUAL REPORT 1981–1982, supra note 147, at 33;
ANNUAL REPORT 1982–1983, supra note 69, at 15.
149
SEC PRAC. SECTION, supra note 125, § 1000.04 (setting forth, as a criterion for
membership, submission of a written application that is accompanied by information required to
be reported annually by all member firms under § 1000.08(g)).
150
See Appendix 1 hereto summarizing the content of both the SEC Practice Section
membership application and the PCAOB registration application.
151
ANNUAL REPORT 1981–1982, supra note 147, at 18.
152
Nagy, PCAOB, supra note 2, at 378.
153
Thomas C. Pearson, Creating Accountability: Increased Legal Status of Accounting and
Auditing Authorities in the Global Capital Markets (U.S. and EU), 31 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 65, 129 (2005).
154
Nagy, Playing Peekaboo, supra note 2, at 1018.
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application process, based on an assertion that providing such consent could violate
the laws of the accounting firm’s home country. This exception continues to
undercut verifiability by curbing the ability of the PCAOB to monitor compliance
of firms based in jurisdictions like China, where the PCAOB (and the SEC) is
unable to exercise regulatory oversight due to asserted conflicts between the
cooperation obligation mandated by S-Ox and the home country laws of the
applicant accounting firm. In sum, neither the PCAOB nor the SECPS has
demonstrated effective dominion over verifiability at the commencement of their
respective oversight relationships with individual public accounting firms.
D. Using Verifiability to Establish Expectations for Investors
SECPS membership, and now PCAOB registration, create expectations for
investors, as an application requiring specific information relevant to auditing public
companies must be submitted and reviewed. Yet, neither the SECPS, Congress, nor
the PCAOB designed these verifiability processes to establish a standard for
admission to their respective oversight regimes upon which public investors could
rely. These entities required that the applications be approved, but failed to
articulate tangible criteria for how adequacy of any particular firm’s application was
to be determined.
PCAOB rules provide some information on this process. Specifically, its rules
require that the Board determine whether approval of each application “is consistent
with the Board’s responsibilities under the Act to protect the interests of investors
and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and
independent audit reports.”
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See id.
Yawen Li, Note, “The Shell Game”: Reverse Merger Companies and the Regulatory Efforts
to Curb Reverse Merger Frauds, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS., 153, 180–81 (2018). In December 2020,
the Holding Foreign Companies Accounting Act was signed into law, barring issuers whose audits
were examined by the PCAOB from trading on U.S. exchanges. Larry Bergmann & Robertson
Park, What Trading Restrictions on China Mean for US Markets, LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2021, 5:51
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1342010/what-trading-restrictions-on-china-mean-forus-markets.
157
See SEC PRAC. SECTION, supra note 125, § 1000.04 (providing that all CPA firms are
eligible for membership in the SECPS and may attain membership by submitting a written
application agreeing to abide by all membership requirements); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 102(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7212(c)(1) (providing that the Board shall approve applications in
accordance with its rules); Section 2. Registration and Reporting, PCAOB, at Rule 2106(a),
https://pcaobus.org/about/rules-rulemaking/rules/section_2 (last visited Dec. 27, 2021) (stating
that the Board will decide whether to approve a registration application based on determining
whether registration of the firm is consistent with the Board’s responsibilities under the Act to
protect investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and
independent audit reports).
158
Section 2. Registration and Reporting, supra note 157, at Rule 2106(a).
156

43829-lcb_25-4 Sheet No. 42 Side A

155

43829-lcb_25-4 Sheet No. 42 Side B

01/04/2022 08:12:00

LCB_25_4_Article_3_Williams (Do Not Delete)

1116

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

12/27/2021 12:59 PM

[Vol. 25.4

159

C M
Y K

01/04/2022 08:12:00

Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Registration with the Board, PCAOB Release
No. 2003-011F, at 6 (Dec. 4, 2017) [hereinafter PCAOB, FAQ].
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 4.
164
See ANNUAL REPORT 1983–1984, supra note 72, at 3, wherein the Chairman of the POB
described the Board’s view that SECPS membership evidenced the industry’s dedication to selfregulation and improved audit services for clients.
165
Mark, supra note 16, at 1110. While funding the POB with fees paid by SECPS
membership was intended to enhance the POB’s independence from the accounting profession’s
influence in the form of the AICPA, the approach ultimately proved ineffective as the AICPA still
controlled the POB’s budget. See Nagy, Playing Peekaboo, supra note 2, at 994–95 (describing the
AICPA’s termination of funding of the POB after the POB made a decision with which the
AICPA disagreed).
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Guidance published by the PCAOB on its application process describes, by
example, circumstances the Board might view as providing a basis for denial of a
registration application. The guidance indicates that disapproval of a registration
application could be deemed appropriate by the Board if the applicant firm violated
the registration provisions of the Act or Board rules by engaging in conduct
requiring PCAOB registration while not so registered, or having personnel who are
legally precluded from participating in the audit of public companies pursuant to a
disciplinary sanction such that there is a question as to whether the firm itself is able
to participate in such audits. The guidance also proffers, as potential grounds for
disapproval, specific conduct of a firm that was previously registered with the Board,
withdrew, and seeks to re-register. Finally, the guidance indicates that the Board
might also consider information learned about the applicant through its oversight
processes.
Like the SECPS, the PCAOB has adopted an open-arms admission policy,
allowing firms that are not involved in the audit of public companies to become
associated with regulation of auditors. This approach was understandable from
the SECPS’s perspective, where participation in the SECPS and the Private
Company Practice Section was considered evidence of acceptance of self-regulation
by the accounting profession. Further, increased SECPS membership translated
to increased funding for the independence mechanism of the self-regulatory scheme,
as SECPS membership dues paid by accounting firms were used to fund the Public
Oversight Board.
This open-arms approach is less rational as it relates to the PCAOB. The
Board’s guidance on registration seems to justify the open admission policy as a nod
to regulatory cooperation and the spirit of entrepreneurialism. Specifically, the
guidance indicates that firms that are not engaged in the business of auditing public
companies may register with the PCAOB to comply with the requirements of others
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regulators whose mission is unrelated to audits of U.S. public companies. The
guidance also acknowledges that firms with no experience auditing public
companies might nonetheless be interested in doing so. The guidance goes on to
disclaim responsibility for all such firms, explaining that firms that are registered
with the Board, but not engaged in activities for which registration is required, are
completely excluded from regulation by the Board. This explanation highlights
the dichotomy between the Board’s mission and its registration approval process; it
also highlights a significant deviation from the SECPS’s approach, which performed
some level of review of the audit work performed by its members on non-SEC
registrants. The PCAOB’s guidance affirms that firms registered for such reasons
are still expected to pay the Board’s annual fees and file required annual reports.
The PCAOB has denied 46 registration applications since its inception in
2003. These denials were primarily focused on the inability of applicant firms to
comply with rules requiring PCAOB registration, rather than concerns about the
quality of audits performed by the firm. While the Board’s 2017 guidance on
registration indicates that registered firms without audit clients would still be subject
to the requirements to pay annual fees and submit annual and special reports, the
registration disapprovals suggest this policy statement was not enforced. The Board
denied eight registration applications from firms on the basis that they had failed
one or both annual requirements to pay fees and file reports while previously
registered.
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166
PCAOB, FAQ, supra note 159, at 4 (“Some regulators have adopted rules requiring
persons subject to their jurisdiction to use PCAOB-registered firms for specified services unrelated
to audits of issuers, brokers, or dealers.”).
167
Id.
168
Id. at 4–5 (stating that registration alone does not subject a firm to Board oversight, and
the Board’s regulatory processes will not be applied to firms that are not engaged in audits covered
by its regulatory authority).
169
See, e.g., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., supra note 129, at 2 (describing the
concept of “report reviews” that would be performed on firms that had no SEC engagements).
170
PCAOB, FAQ, supra note 159, at 4.
171
See PCAOB Registration Disapproval Notices, PCAOB., https://pcaobus.org/oversight/
registration/disapprovalnotices (last visited Dec. 27, 2021).
172
See id. (reflecting the disapproval of 36 registration applications due to the failure of the
applicant firm to register with the PCAOB prior to engaging in audit activities for which
registration was required).
173
See Registration Application of Vail & Knauth LLP, PCAOB Release No. 102-2013-001
(Feb. 21, 2013); Registration Application of Ogbomo CPA, LLC, PCAOB Release No. 1022014-004 (Oct. 7, 2014); Registration Application of David R. Ramos, CPA, PCAOB Release
No. 102-2014-002 (Mar. 6, 2014); Registration Application of Lawrence Hoffman, Certified
Public Accountant, P.C., PCAOB Release No. 102-2014-001 (Jan. 28, 2014); Registration
Application of Khalsa McBrearty Accountancy, LLP, PCAOB Release No. 102-2015-001 (Jan.
26, 2014); Registration Application of Morty Etgar, P.A., PCAOB Rel. No. 102-2015-002 (May
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Scholars have remarked upon the close resemblance between verification and
certification, noting that verification can be used to substantiate marketing claims
regarding quality. SECPS membership and PCAOB registration, respectively,
raise concern that admission to these organizations could create misleading
assumptions about the quality of the accounting firms that have achieved such
status. Both the SECPS and PCAOB make the content of applications for
membership and registration publicly available, potentially undercutting this
concern through disclosure. PCAOB personnel have acknowledged the potential for
confusion regarding the import of its generous admission practice, remarking
publicly that the agency has adopted a “low bar” for registration eligibility. As a
result, there are a significant number of firms registered with the PCAOB (and
therefore authorized to audit public companies) that may lack the ability to do so
competently. According to the Board’s 2019 Annual Report, 1,796 firms were
registered with the PCAOB, but only 597 of them (33%) engaged in audits of public
companies requiring regulatory oversight. Unlike the SECPS, the Board
undertakes no supervisory efforts with respect to these firms.
The PCAOB’s approach to verifiability has raised internal concern at the
agency. In 2013, former Board member Jeanette Franzel publicly discussed the
significant number of registered firms that were not subject to Board oversight.
She indicated that the Board was considering this trend and potential confusion
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18, 2015); Registration Application of Kingston Smith LLP, PCAOB Release No. 102-2016-001
(Dec. 13, 2016); Registration Application of GYL Decauwer LLP, PCAOB Release No. 1022018-001 (June 13, 2018).
174
Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 3–4
(2012) (discussing the use of third parties—such as auditors or even the PCAOB itself—to certify
compliance to the government, noting “third-party verification closely resembles third-party
certification, used in voluntary schemes to substantiate marketing claims . . . . Some scholars have
questioned the competence and accountability of third-party certifiers in voluntary certification
schemes.”).
175
See SEC PRAC. SECTION, supra note 125, § 5000.32; Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and
Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 327, 401 (2004); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 102(e), 15 U.S.C. § 7212(e).
176
See Bill Gradison & Ron Boster, The PCAOB’s First Seven Years: A Retrospection, 4
CURRENT ISSUES IN AUDITING A9, A11 (2010) (“Contrary to common opinion, the bar for firms
to be registered is not high. Registering a firm is not an indication in itself that the firm performs
or is capable of performing quality audits.”).
177
PCAOB, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, at iii (2020), https://pcaobus.org/about/annual-report
(follow hyperlink labeled “2019”).
178
PCAOB, FAQ, supra note 159, at 4 (explaining that registration alone does not subject
a firm to Board oversight, and the Board’s regulatory processes will not be applied to firms that
are not engaged in audits covered by its regulatory authority).
179
Jeanette M. Franzel, Bd. Member, PCAOB, Address at the Association of Government
Accountants 62d Annual PDC: Accountability: Protecting Investors, the Public Interest and
Prosperity (July 17, 2013).
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PCAOB, FAQ, supra note 159, at 4–5.
See SEC PRAC. SECTION, supra note 125, § 5000.32; Backer, supra note 175, at 401;
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 102(e), 15 U.S.C. § 7212(e).
182
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 102(e), 15 U.S.C. § 7212(e).
183
Section 2. Registration and Reporting, supra note 157, at Rule 2300. PCAOB Rule 2300
(Aug. 2009), https://pcaobus.org/about/rules-rulemaking/rules/section_2.
184
Id. at Rule 2300(d).
185
Id. at Rule 2300(h).
186
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(g)(2).
187
Section 2. Registration and Reporting, supra note 157, at Rule 2300.
188
Registrations may be accessed by visiting Registration, Annual and Special Reporting,
PCAOB, https://rasr.pcaobus.org/Search/Search.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2021).
181
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about the import of PCAOB registration for such firms. A few years later, the Board
made some effort in this regard by updating its guidance on registration to provide
improved disclosure on this question. A significant question remains as to
whether investors and public companies seeking registered auditors are aware of the
limitations of the PCAOB’s verifiability process.
Like the SECPS membership rules, S-Ox mandates the public availability of
information submitted by applicant firms. Unlike SECPS rules, S-Ox qualifies
the publication of firm information by directing the PCAOB to shield from public
disclosure information the agency deems to be “proprietary.” The PCAOB
executes this edict by permitting firms to identify, in registration applications and
annual reports, those specific items of information the firms believes is proprietary
and provide the Board with support for its assertion. Such information, when
identified by the firm as proprietary, is shielded from public view while the firm’s
request that such information be treated as confidential is evaluated.
Responsibility for making these determinations is delegated to Board staff; the
Board may call any such determination for review, and a firm that is denied
confidential treatment of alleged proprietary information may appeal that
determination to the Board as well. Once a final determination is reached with
respect to confidential treatment of the identified information, the information is
disclosed to the extent permitted by the determination.
Requests for confidential treatment of information contained in registration
applications have petered out over time. Of the 740 registration applications
approved between 2003 and 2005 and publicly available on the PCAOB’s website,
271 contained requests for confidential treatment of information contained
therein. Publicly available information further reveals that of the 113 registration
applications approved by the Board between 2017 and 2019, none contained
requests for confidential treatment. In fact, applications received during this time
contained a remarkably minimal amount of information. These applications
generally disclosed the firm’s name, contact information, licensing information, and
a summary of the firm’s quality control policies. The evolution towards a virtually
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empty registration application was inevitable under the current verifiability model
of the PCAOB, as much of the information contained in the registration application
relates to the firm’s practice with respect to audits that are the subject of Board
oversight, and the overwhelming population of applicant firms are not engaged in
such activities at the time of registration.
IV. REDESIGNING THE APPROACH TO REGULATED AUDITORS TO
PRODUCE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT
A. Mandate Sunlight

C M
Y K
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189
Information available on the PCAOB’s website regarding registration applications
indicates that of the 948 applications approved between 2003 and 2005 (and still publicly
available as of December 31, 2020), 561 of those firms audited public companies in the recent
past or expect to do so during the year of registration. Id. Of the 113 applications approved and
available for the period of 2017 to 2019, only eight firms indicated that they expected to audit a
public company during the year of registration. Id.
190
See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 102 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7212).
191
See Registration System for Public Accounting Firms, PCAOB Release No. 2003-007
(May 6, 2003).
192
See Amendments to Conform the Board’s Rules and Forms to the Dodd-Frank Act and
Make Certain Updates and Clarifications, PCAOB Release No. 2013-010, at 5 (Dec. 4, 2013)
(“[T]he Board is amending its registration, withdrawal, and reporting forms . . . and the general
instructions to these forms, to call for relevant broker and dealer audit client information.”).
193
Id. at 55 n.188 (explaining where registration application information may be found).
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The PCAOB’s registration process was outlined in broad strokes in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, leaving details relating to the form, content, and
process of registration to be determined by rules promulgated by the agency. In
2003, the Board adopted a “registration system” consisting of rules and a format for
the registration application, with little concrete information on the criteria for
registration. After more than 15 years of registering accounting firms, the
registration process has remained largely unchanged, with only a few pro forma
alterations in 2013 to accommodate the Dodd-Frank Act and the addition of
broker-dealer audits to the Board’s oversight scope. Yet, the demographics of the
firms seeking PCAOB registration have changed significantly with the passage of
time.
The firms more recently seeking registration with the PCAOB generally fall
into one of two categories: (1) firms that were previously registered with the Board,
withdrew, and seek to register anew; and (2) firms that were not previously
registered, yet seek PCAOB authorization to audit public companies and/or brokerdealers. Firms in the former category inspire a host of logical inquiries that the
registration application does not address. Such inquiries include whether the firm
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audited public companies while previously registered and whether those audits were
inspected by the Board. The Board’s guidance on registration implies that the Board
asks such questions behind its closed doors while vetting registration applications,
but there is no transparency around that process. Firms in the latter category raise
questions about the competencies of new entrants to the arena of auditing public
companies. What training or experience do its personnel possess in this regard?
The PCAOB took steps towards improving transparency in this regard when
it adopted Form AP in 2016. Form AP requires registered firms to file reports
with the PCAOB disclosing the name of the partner leading the firm’s audit for each
public company for which the firm serves as outside auditor. However, this
information is not mandated on the registration application, creating a gap in the
information provided to investors, scholars, and other users of the publicly available
registration application. Effective regulation demands transparency and
accountability around such verification processes.
Finally, any regulatory process involving verifiability should be subject to
routine and public review. The SEC’s Division of Examinations (formerly the
Office of Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations) is responsible for conducting
examinations of the PCAOB, yet there is little evidence of such oversight on the
194
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PCAOB, FAQ, supra note 159, at 6 (“In the case of registration applications of firms that
have previously been registered with the Board . . . the Board will also consider any relevant
information learned by the Board in the course of its oversight activity.”).
195
The SECPS’s membership process addressed concerns about the competence of member
firms engaged in accounting and auditing by, among other things, requiring its members who
spend at least 25% of their time performing certain audit-related activities to devote at least 40%
of their continuing education to subjects relating to accounting and auditing. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCT. OFF., supra note 66, at 90. The PCAOB adopted this SECPS provision as an interim
standard when it began operations in 2003, but the provision only applies to firms that were
members of the SECPS at the time the interim standards were adopted. See Hearing on Accounting
and Auditing Standards: Pending Proposals and Emerging Issues Before the H. Subcomm. on Cap.
Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 111th Cong. App A at 7 (2010) (statement of Daniel L.
Goelzer, Acting Chairman, PCAOB). To date, the PCAOB has not acted to finalize these
standards. See J. Robert Brown Jr., Bd. Member, PCAOB, Statement Regarding the PCAOB’s
Revised Research and Standard-Setting Agendas: Reducing Credibility, Accountability and
Confidence in the Financial Reporting Process (Oct. 13, 2020) (asserting that the Board’s failure
to update the interim standards adopted in 2003 was inconsistent with its promise of innovative
oversight).
196
Honigsberg, supra note 105, at 1884.
197
Id.
198
See Brown, supra note 120, at 136 (advocating that non-governmental agencies with
governmental powers should be subject to mechanisms, including sunshine laws, to ensure their
accountability).
199
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 107(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (a); see also Cheryl Nichols,
Addressing Inept SEC Enforcement Efforts: Lessons from Madoff, the Hedge Fund Industry, and Title
IV of the Dodd-Frank Act for U.S. and Global Financial Systems, 31 NW J. INT’L L. & BUS. 637,
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SEC’s website. Moreover, the SEC reportedly outsourced its monitoring function
regarding the PCAOB by hiring former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt to consult on
whistleblower complaints lodged with the SEC in 2019. Any formula for the
creation of an effective audit regulator should include independent reviews
performed by a disinterested agency, such as the U.S. Government General
Accountability Office.
B. Streamline Verifiability
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663 n.147 (2011).
200
Jean Eaglesham and Dave Michaels, Accounting Regulator Had Climate of Fear and
Distrust, Report Says, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2021, 6:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/accounting-regulator-had-climate-of-fear-and-distrust-report-says-11624918488.
201
As of March 20, 2021, 866 firms registered with the PCAOB filed annual reports with
the Board indicating that no activity with respect to audit reports on public companies or brokerdealers. Registered Firms, PCAOB, https://pcaobus.org/oversight/registration/registered-firms (last
visited Dec. 27, 2021).
202
Adrienne Gonzalez, Per the PCAOB, Being Registered with the PCAOB Isn’t the Same
as Being Scrutinized by the PCAOB, GOING CONCERN (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.
goingconcern.com/pcaob-being-registered-pcaob-isnt-same-being-scrutinized-pcaob/.
203
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides that the Board must collect a fee from each registered
public accounting firm sufficient to cover the costs of processing and reviewing registration
applications and annual reports. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 102(f), 15 U.S.C. § 7212(f).
204
See Announcement of Annual Fee and Increase in Minimum Registration Application
Fee, PCAOB Release No. 2010-002 (April 13, 2010) (announcing an increase in the registration
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Effective auditor regulation demands appropriate verifiability. In mandating
that all firms opining on the financial statements of public companies be registered
with the PCAOB, Congress relieved the Board of the SECPS’s burden of coaxing
firms into oversight with incentives and less onerous obligations. The PCAOB
nonetheless continued the open admission practices of the SECPS with little
rationale as to how the practice aligns with its regulatory mission of improved audit
quality. As a result, the PCAOB is managing a significant population of registered
firms for which it exercises no oversight. This practice continues to benefit firms
by giving them the credential of PCAOB registration, but harms investors and
public companies who may be unaware that registration is not an indication of the
firm’s audit quality.
Registration applications from firms that do not intend to participate in audits
of public companies or broker dealers are virtually devoid of information, since
much of the application calls for information about audit activity. Yet these
applications must be processed, reviewed, acted upon by the PCAOB, and also made
publicly available. The costs of these reviews are theoretically shared among
accounting firms. However, the registration and annual fee amounts have
remained unchanged since 2010. The Board indicated in 2010 that it would
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adjust the annual fee as necessary to “take account of variances between estimated
costs and actual costs, or significant changes in the number of registered firms,”
but has publicly disclosed no such adjustments since that date. In the absence of
public information about the costs of these processes, it is unclear whether the fees
being collected are adequate, or whether those costs are being underwritten by SEC
registrants, and therefore public investors.
C. Strengthen Registration Criteria
A redesigned approach to audit regulation should provide tangible criteria for
verifiability. Firms seeking to audit public companies should demonstrate some
minimal knowledge of these specialized audits, either by experience or by specialized
training. It is overly optimistic to expect a firm that has never audited a public
company to perform such an audit skillfully, and somewhat mystifying for a public
company to select such a firm as its outside auditor. Research performed by a team
of scholars, including a PCAOB Economic Research Fellow, used proprietary
PCAOB data to conclude that first-time auditors of public companies perform lower
quality audits, are more likely to be cited for audit deficiencies by PCAOB inspectors
in their initial and subsequent audits, are more likely to be the subject of PCAOB
enforcement actions, and spend less time performing audits.
This concept is further exemplified in the disciplinary action brought by the
PCAOB against the registered firm of HLB Mann Judd (“HLB”) in 2020. HLB,
located in Australia, registered with the PCAOB in February 2015. Its registration
application disclosed the firm’s plan to audit an issuer, CBD Energy Limited, during
2015. The application included the firm’s contact information, licensing
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fee set in 2003 for firms with no issuer clients and setting the annual fee for registered firms).
205
See id. at 2.
206
Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate About Securities SelfRegulation: It’s Time to End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax Exemption, 31 VA. TAX REV. 135, 193
n.300 (2011) (explaining that while audit firms pay fees to the PCAOB, the vast majority of its
annual revenues are derived from fees levied upon public companies in proportion to their average
market capitalizations and upon certain broker-dealers).
207
Andrew Kitto, Phillip T. Lamoreaux & Devin Williams, Do Entry Barriers to the Public
Company Audit Market Deter Low Quality Audit Firms?, (May 6, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3572688. The paper noted,
“These findings are consistent with first time auditors providing a misleading signal of quality
prior to entering the market.” Id. This author posits that the PCAOB’s approval of these firms’
registration applications could be one of those signals.
208
See HLB Mann Judd, Darryl Swindells & Aidan Smith, Order Instituting Disciplinary
Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing Sanctions, PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-008
(June 29, 2020).
209
Id. at 2–3.
210
HLB Mann Judd: Application for Registration with PCAOB, PCAOB 8 (Jan. 27, 2015),
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https://rasr.pcaobus.org/Forms/FormSummary.aspx?ID=E55FF5689BBC613C7E56F57E0412F109.
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See id.
See BlueNRGY Grp. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F/A), at 31 (July 10, 2015).
213
See id. at 32, 74.
214
See id. at 31.
215
HLB Mann Judd, Darryl Swindells & Aidan Smith, Order Instituting Disciplinary
Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing Sanctions, PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-008, at
3 (June 29, 2020).
216
Id. at 3–4.
217
See Report on 2018 Inspection of HLB Mann Judd, PCAOB Release No. 104-2019075, at 3 (Feb. 28, 2019).
218
HLB Mann Judd, Darryl Swindells & Aidan Smith, Order Instituting Disciplinary
Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing Sanctions, PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-008, at
1 (June 29, 2020).
212
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information regarding the firm and its personnel, and the firm’s quality control
manual. The application, in accordance with Board rules, contained no information
about the firm’s experience or training in auditing U.S. public companies.
BlueNRGY Group Limited, successor to CBD Energy Limited, filed an
amended annual report with the SEC (on Form 20-F) in July 2015, indicating that
its auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, had resigned in November 2014 because the
outstanding and unpaid professional fees owed by the company deprived the auditor
of its ability to be independent. The annual report also disclosed that BlueNRGY
had been in a voluntary program regarding its insolvency, and further, that its
audited financial statements for fiscal years 2013 and 2012 could no longer be relied
upon. The company indicated that it had appointed HLB to reaudit the
company’s financial statements for 2012 and 2013, as well as audit its financial
statements for 2014.
After its registration with the PCAOB was approved, HLB issued audit reports
on the company for its fiscal years 2012 through 2014. HLB then issued audit
reports on the company for fiscal years 2015 through 2017. The PCAOB
inspected audits of the firm in 2018 and released its findings of audit deficiencies in
2019. In June 2020, the Board revoked the registration of the firm based on
numerous violations of PCAOB rules, including its failure to consider whether it
was competent to undertake the engagement and whether Australian audit standards
were different from those mandated by the PCAOB.
HLB Mann is the poster child for a rethink on the standard applied by an audit
regulator for the registration of accounting firms seeking to audit public companies.
The regulator for public company auditors should set minimum criteria for
verifiability, including experience and education. Requiring that firms seeking to
audit public companies have some tangible indicia of knowledge apropos to the task
would reflect a true shift from an industry-centered organization interested in
facilitating access to public companies for firms of any caliber, to a regulation-
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focused agency that is truly concerned about the quality of audits being performed.
Such criteria could deprive smaller firms of any perceived prestige associated with
grants of registration, but creates little concern from a regulatory perspective that is
centered on improved audit quality.
A former PCAOB Board member gave a speech in 2018 suggesting that the
Board might delve more deeply into a firm’s quality control processes during the
application process, rather than just examine the quality control policies the firm
provides with the application. Former Board Member Hamm remarked:
If we get more information on the design and implementation of an
applicant’s quality control protocols upfront, we are better able to spot patent
defects and weaknesses. Armed with that information, we could require the
applicant to fix those shortcomings before ever auditing the financial
statements of a public company or broker-dealer. In other words, putting
prevention into action.

This sentiment well reflects the potential of the registration process as a regulatory
tool to improve the quality of audits in advance of potentially subpar audit reports
that are relied upon by investors.
CONCLUSION
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Kathleen M. Hamm, Bd. Member, PCAOB, Quality Control: The Next Frontier at the
University of Tennessee Neel Corporate Governance Distinguished Speaker Series (Nov. 30,
2018).
220
See Jack High, Introduction: A Tale of Two Disciplines, in REGULATION: ECONOMIC
THEORY AND HISTORY 1, 1–6 (Jack High ed., 1991) (describing the shift in economic theory from
identifying the motivation for regulation as the advancement of public interests to the
advancement of regulated business’s interests).
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Regulation itself is challenging, representing a perpetual tension between the
desire to rectify abuses and the need to deliver benefits to regulated entities. That
tension could easily explain the decades-old failure to unlock the alchemy of
effective audit regulation, but provides no administrable formula to achieve the
desired output of tangible and measurable improvement in audit quality. Whether
the PCAOB is subsumed under the SEC, is replaced by yet another new regulatory
creation, or continues its current existence, verifiability is a key component of
regulation that must be addressed. This Article concludes that effective regulation
of auditors must be permeated with the goal of high audit quality. That theme must
be incorporated into the criteria used to determine which accounting firms should
be authorized to audit public companies, and the disclosures that such firms must
provide in seeking authorization. Firms seeking permission to audit publicly held
companies should be required to demonstrate adequate training and knowledge for
doing so. The personnel involved in these audits should be required to disclose their
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involvement at each stage of interaction with the regulator, including at registration.
The notion that all accounting firms not otherwise barred should be permitted to
audit public companies for the sake of competition must be soundly rejected.
Finally, the regulator should be obligated to perform regular self-assessment of its
verifiability processes and should be subjected to credible, routine, and independent
examinations of its performance.
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APPENDIX 1: CONTENT OF SECPS AND PCAOB APPLICATIONS

Application
Content by Topic

PCAOB
(as of Aug.
2003)

PCAOB
(as of Dec.
2013)

X

X

9*

9*

9

9

X

X

X

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

X
9

X
X

9*
X

9
X

X
9

9
9

X
9

X
9

9

9

9

9

9

X

9*

9*

9

9

X

X

X

X

9*

9*

9

9

X

X

X

X

9*

9*
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SECPS
(as of June
1997)
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Agreement to
cooperate with requests
for testimony or
documents
Agreement to Comply
with Organization
Obligations
Name of Contact
Person
Legal Form of
Organization
(partnership, etc.)
Firm licenses
authorizing auditing or
accounting
Organization Chart
Firm’s year ends (for
both fiscal and
continuing education
purposes)
Firm Offices
Count of CPAs,
professional staff and
total personnel
Names of SEC Audit
Clients
Statement that Firm
has complied with
applicable
independence
requirements
Description of firm’s
quality control
policies, including
those to monitor
independence
Information required
under GAAP regarding
pending litigation
Information regarding
specified criminal,
governmental, civil,
administrative or
disciplinary
proceedings

SECPS
(as of Aug.
1979)
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Information regarding
fees charged to SEC
audit clients for various
audit and non-audit
services
9
Information Regarding
Disagreements with
Former SEC Audit
X
Clients
Confirmation that
Firm reported pending
litigation to
appropriate AICPA
Committee
X
Information on
mergers/acquisitions
X
with other Firms
Name and location of
foreign associated firms
in shared professional
network with Firm
X
Name and location of
associated entities
engaged in accounting
or issuing audit reports
X
List of accountants
associated with Firm
and corresponding
license numbers
X
* Mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
** Reporting of item is required after resignation
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9
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X**

9

X**

X**

9

X**

X**

X

9

9

X

9*

9*
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